This paper analyzes the consequences of China's fertility policies and social security reforms on savings, interest rates and the required social security adjustments. A key innovation is to allow for endogenous fertility responses and its aggregate feedback effect. We develop an overlapping generations model, in which fertility decisions, capital accumulation, and the evolution of social security are endogenously determined. In this framework, the endogenous responses of fertility and interest rates are crucial for understanding the fiscal adjustments the social security system needs to undergo. A key result is that the sequence and the combination of fertility, social security or capital account reforms may be important in determining the fiscal pressure placed on the pension program. China may need to juggle with policy reforms that have conflicting or offsetting effects on the financing of its social security.
One of the central points argued in this paper is that the required social security adjustmentsin lengths of time and also in magnitude-depend crucially on whether fertility can endogenously respond, and whether interest rates endogenously adjust (which hinges on the degree of financial integration of the economy with the rest of the world). Taking fertility as exogenous severs the feedback loop between fertility and social security. More restricted interest rate movements in an open economy than in a closed-economy severs the feedback of interest rate changes onto fertility, which in turn impinge on social security. These endogenous feedback links mean that the dynamic and quantitative implications of policy choices and economic scenarios in China will have distinct implications from a more standard model in which endogenous responses of fertility are absent.
At the same time, understanding the aggregate impact of these birth-control policies on China's economy requires a sense of how its natural rate of fertility would have evolved along with its institutional and economic development. Endogenizing fertility is therefore, to all intents and purposes, a necessary step towards conducting a comprehensive analysis of social security reforms.
The appropriate framework, accounting for important general equilibrium and feedback effects of fertility, saving and interest rates in various degrees of financial openness-is hitherto absent. 5 A main objective of this paper is to develop a tractable framework in which the underlying mechanism on how these variables interact are made transparent, and from which the consequences of policy reforms in China can be elucidated. Our generalized framework consists of a three-period overlapping generations model with endogenous capital accumulation and a social security system. Children are both 'consumption goods' and 'investment goods'-as they transfer resources to support their parents in old-age. 6 Importantly, elements such as social security which affects the consumption profile over the lifetime (through taxation and transfers when old) and thus interest rates, modify the incentives to have children. between fertility and interest rates based on optimal saving and investment decisions. A greater number of children increases the marginal productivity of capital and thus investment. Moreover, it is associated with higher expenditures and larger transfers in old-age, both of which lead to lower saving. Higher fertility thus leads to higher interest rates. The second condition is a negative relationship based on optimal fertility choices: higher interest rate-to-wage-ratio lowers the financial benefits of children and hence discourages fertility. The third key relationship is determined by a sustainable social security system, which embeds endogenous changes in social security variables when fertility adjusts. We first show analytically how the interactions of these relationships conjoin to determine interest rates, fertility and social security contribution rates in the long run. We also investigate how these variables react in the long-run to social security reforms, fertility policies and growth evolutions-both under autarky and under financial integration.
The framework can be used to analyze the social security implications of various important policy reforms that policymakers in China are facing, and expose their potentially conflicting or offsetting nature. The policy choices that are imminent and likely to interact include 1) fertility controls and their relaxation; 2) social security reforms, in particular increasing the coverage and generosity of the existing system; and 3) capital account liberalization. On its own, these policies may impinge on the social security system to various degrees, but our analysis suggests that the combination and sequence of these reforms may be more or less costly in terms of the amount of fiscal pressure it exerts on the pension system.
In particular, we show that the population aging caused by the one child policy puts less strain on the generosity of the pension system in a closed economy than in an open economy. In other words, postponing capital market integration may ease social security pressure and the amount of tax hikes required to maintain social security benefits. The reason is that although lower fertility requires an increase in taxes, the endogenous fall in interest rates due to higher saving can limit the fiscal pressure by indirectly stimulating fertility. Thus, the adverse effects of the one child policy on the pension system are more severe in an open economy than in a closed economy-and are also predicted to be more severe in a framework that takes into account the endogenous response of fertility. The feedback of an increase of social security taxes onto a reduction in fertility-which then feeds back again onto contribution rates-can imply a much longer adjustment in taxes-thus making the persistence of the one child policy shock much larger than under a model that treats fertility as exogenous.
Increasing the coverage and the generosity of the social security system is high on the government agenda, but is obviously somewhat in conflict with recent policies intended to reduce fertilitywhen it comes to concerns about the pension system financing. Jointly undertaken, social security taxes would need to rise substantially. Postponing this reform after the relaxation of fertility constraints may ease social security pressure; but also, increasing benefits in conjunction to (or after)
liberalizing the capital account may be more cost-effective-as adverse interest rate movements is mitigated. This, in turn, would limit the endogenous fall in fertility and thus the necessary tax increase to finance the generosity of the new pension system.
Finally, we investigate how a permanently slower growth path in China would affect the path of reforms and the sustainability of the pension system. We find that the fiscal pressure on the existing system could potentially be very large if the growth slowdown occurs during the coming years in which the generation of the only-child becomes the main contributors, and even more so if China liberalizes further its capital account. We find that the required tax rises accompanying the growth slowdown is actually larger than what standard models with exogenous fertility would predict. As the benefits of children in terms of future transfers fall-in the face of slower growth-the optimal fertility also falls, putting further strain on the social security system. In an open economy, the drop in fertility is even larger since interest rates do not fall (or by less so) with slower growth.
Thus, to avoid an immediate and massive tax hike under a slower-growth scenario, China would potentially have to choose between reducing the generosity of the existing system or postponing its capital account liberalization. 
Model
The structure of the economy is close to Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013), and is characterized by an overlapping generations structure in which agents live for three periods: youth (y), middle-age (m), and old-age (o). The measure of total population L t at date t comprises the three co-existing generations. We denote L γ,t the population of each generation γ = {y, m, o} such that the overall population L t satisfies: L t = L y,t + L m,t + L o,t . At the end of their youth period (y), individuals start working, supplying one unit of labor inelastically but also decide their number of children.
Denote n t the number of children (per head) that young individuals decide to have at the end of the period t. Then, demographics evolves according to: L y,t+1 = n t L y,t . Individuals also work in middle-age (m), and retire when old (o).
Production
Let K t−1 denote the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t and e t L y,t + L m,t the total labor input employed in period t, where e t is the relative efficiency of young workers (e t < 1). The gross output in country i is:
where 0 < α < 1, and A t is country-specific productivity. We let g A,t denote the exogenous (gross) rate of growth of productivity, so that A t = g A,t A t−1 . The capital stock depreciates at a rate δ and evolves according the standard law of motion:
where I t denotes investment at date t.
Factor markets are competitive so that each factor, capital and labor, earns its marginal product.
Thus, the wage rates per unit of labor in youth and middle age for country i are
denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The rental rate earned by capital in production equals the marginal product of capital, r i K,t = α (k t−1 ) α−1 . The gross rate of return earned between period t−1 and t in country i is therefore
In what follows, we will make the following assumption throughout, for analytical convenience:
This implies that the rate of return to capital equalizes the marginal productivity of capital:
This assumption is reasonably innocuous and quantitatively unimportant given that a period corresponds to one generation in the current model.
The Social Security System
The social security system encapsulates a pay-as-you-go system (PAYGO), a fully-funded system, or more generally, some combination of the two. Each young and middle-aged agent in period t + 1 pays, respectively, a Social Security tax in the amount of τ t+1 w y,t+1 and τ t+1 w m,t+1 . An old retiree in period t + 1 receives social security benefits in the amount of σ t+1 w m,t , where σ t+1 represents the replacement ratio at date t + 1.
The government can run budget surpluses and deficits to finance the social security system. Let B t denote government assets accumulated at the end of period t. The sources and uses of the funds for the social security system in period t + 1 are thus given by
The left hand side of the equation represents the sources of funds for the Social security system in period t, which consist of Social Security taxes plus gross returns on assets. The right hand side represents the uses of funds by the Social Security system in the same period, including retirement benefits paid to old consumers and the purchase of capital to hold in the trust fund (or issuance of government debt for B t+1 < 0). Using Eqs. 1 and 2, Eq. 3 can be rewritten as:
where b t denotes government assets as a share of GDP: b t ≡ Bt Yt . Eq. 4 captures the dynamics of the social security system, defined by the set of variables {b t ; τ t ; σ t }, as a function of the endogenous state variables {k t ; n t−1 }. This equation makes clear the impact of growth and the interest rate on the financing of a social security system. Higher growth driven by productivity, demographics, or capital accumulation tends to relax the budget constraint through its impact on tax revenues, relative to spending (first term on the left-hand side), but also implies higher investment into capital for a given b t+1 > 0. If the government has positive assets (b t > 0), a higher rate of return on capital (αk α−1 t ) increases revenues.
Households decisions
Consider an individual who is young in period t. The agent supplies inelastically one unit of labor in youth and in middle-age, and earns a wage rate w y,t and w m,t+1 , which is used, in each period, for consumption and asset accumulation a y,t and a m,t+1 . At the end of period t, the young agent then makes the decision on the number of children n t to bear. In middle-age, in t + 1, the agent transfers a combined amount of T m,t+1 to his n t children and parents. In old-age, the agent consumes all available resources, which is financed by gross return on accumulated assets, Ra m,t+1 , transfers from children T o,t+2 and social security transfers σ t+2 w m,t+1 . A consumer thus maximizes the life-time utility including benefits from having n t children:
where v > 0 reflects the preference for children, and 0 < β < 1. The sequence of budget constraints obeys:
Without loss of generality, the cost of raising kids is assumed to be paid by parents in middleage, in period t + 1, for a child born at the end of period t. The total cost of raising n t children falls in the mold of a time-cost that is proportional to current wages, φn t w m,t+1 , where φ > 0.
These costs can be interpreted as "mouth-to-feed-costs" and education costs, which are substantial for Chinese households. 7 Transfers made to the middle-aged agent's parents amount to a fraction ψn −1 t−1 / of current labor income w m,t+1 , with ψ > 0 and > 0. ψ denotes the degree of altruism towards parents and is an important feature of Chinese society, where old-age support is mainly provided by the children (see Choukhmane et al. (2013) ). As in Choukhmane et al. (2013) , we assume that the fraction of wages transferred to parents is decreasing in the number of siblings-to capture the possibility of free-riding among siblings sharing the burden of transfers. The intensity of free-riding is captured by (1 − ). 8 The combined amount of transfers made by the middle-aged agent in period t + 1 to his children and parents thus satisfy
In old-age, agents become receivers of transfers from a total of n t number of children:
Assumption 2
The young are subject to a credit constraint which is binding in all periods:
which permits the young to borrow up to a constant fraction θ of the present value of future wage income. This assumption is realistic in the case of China, where borrowing by young generations is very small. The parameter θ allows us to generate realistic age-saving profiles and captures the lack of financial development of the Chinese credit market (see Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2013)). 9
Saving decisions. The assumption of log utility implies that the optimal consumption of the middle-age is a constant fraction of the present value of lifetime resources, which consist of disposable income-of what remains after the repayment of debt from the previous period-and the present value of transfers to be received in old-age, less current transfers to children and parents:
Transfers from middle-aged to their children are not assumed to enter the consumption of the young. Implicitly, we assume that this is consumed in an interim period when children, before entering the labor markets (or equivalently, costs of children are a pure resource cost). Note that, with credit constraints on young individuals, this is however irrelevant as long as those are binding (Assumption 2).
8 See Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a model where transfers towards parents are decreasing in the number of siblings as the outcome of a strategic game between siblings. 9 We assume that the income profile is steep enough (e small enough and/or gA high enough relative to θ). We check in our simulations that the constraint is indeed binding.
It follows from Eq. 5 that the optimal asset holding of a middle-aged individual is
Eq. 7 is important in that it shows the partial equilibrium effects of fertility, the interest rate and the social security system on saving. Higher fertility (n t ) tends to lower saving because of higher spending on children ('expenditure channel'), and because of higher expected future transfers received from children ('transfer channel'). Similarly, higher social security contributions τ t+1 and a higher expected replacement rate σ t+2 reduces the incentives to save by respectively lowering disposable income and increasing future wealth. Finally, a lower interest rate raises the present value of wealth and thus lowers saving--with the income and substitution effects associated with interest rate changes canceling out under the assumption of log-utility.
Fertility decisions. Fertility decisions hinge on equating the marginal utility of bearing an
additional child compared to the net marginal cost of raising the child:
The right hand side is the net cost, in terms of the consumption good, of having an additional child.
The net cost is the current marginal cost of rearing a child, ∂T m,t+1 /∂n t less the present value of the benefit from receiving transfers next period from an additional child, ∂T o,t+2 /∂n t . Children are, at the same time, 'consumption goods' (through the parameter v), and 'investment goods'.
Lower wage growth relative to interest rates lowers the returns to investing in children (relative to investing in capital), and thus discourages having children. Eq. 8 can be rewritten as
and is the first equation describing the dynamics of the two endogenous state variables {k t ; n t−1 }, for a given path of social security system {b t ; τ t ; σ t } t≥0 .
Capital markets clearing
The market clearing condition for capital markets equalizes the supply of wealth by households and the government to the aggregate capital stock:
Using the equations describing the wealth accumulation by households (Eqs. 6 and 7) and the equilibrium wages and interest rate (Eqs. 1 and 2), the capital market clearing equation can be written as
Eq. 10 is our second equation describing the dynamics of our two endogenous state variables {k t ; n t−1 } for a given path of social security system {b t ; τ t ; σ t } t≥0 .
The dynamics of the state variables {k t ; n t−1 } is thus defined by the equations corresponding the fertility choice (Eq. 9) and the equilibrium in the capital market (Eq. 10), where the social security system defined by the path of {b t ; τ t ; σ t } t≥0 satisfies the budget constraint of the government (Eq. 4) at all dates. We now turn to the analysis of the model at its steady-state.
Steady-state analysis: three fundamental equations
To obtain analytical solutions for the long run, we make the following additional assumptions, Assumption 3 Transfers are not subject to decreasing returns in children: = 1
Assumption 4 e = 0
Apart from analytical convenience in making the first two assumptions, the third one limits the scope of taxation for social security to make sure that individuals will want a strictly positive number of children. With these assumptions we arrive at the three key relationships linking social security variables, the interest rate and fertility that characterize the economy in the steady-state,
KK curve. The first relationship derives from the capital markets condition, Eq. 10, and captures saving dynamics:
. This KK curve is upward sloping with respect to n, based on four different channels. First is the standard effect that higher population growth (higher fertility) increases the marginal productivity of capital. Second, a greater number of children raises total expenditures which tends to reduce saving and drive up the rate of return ('expenditure channel'). This channel disappears whenever the cost of children φ goes to zero. The third channel relates to the transfers children confer to parents. With higher fertility, middle-age savers expect to receive larger transfers when old, which lowers saving and increases the rate of interest ('transfer channel'). This channel disappears whenever ψ goes to zero. 10 Fourth and last, higher fertility increases the proportion of young borrowers, increasing the interest rate. This effect is dampened when θ is small. Hence, the steepness of the interest curve with respect to n is larger whenever the cost of children (φ) are large, altruism towards parents (ψ) is large and whenever θ is large (i.e more relaxed credit constraints).
The partial equilibrium comparative statics on R KK --holding social security variables (τ, σ) and fertility n constant-yield
Less borrowing from households (lower θ), or from the government (higher b), lowers the interest rate. Higher productivity growth g A increases the interest rate by raising the marginal productivity of capital, an effect that tends to be magnified whenever altruism towards parents (ψ) is larger--as higher growth also increases expected transfers received from children when old and thus lowers incentives to save.
NN curve. The second important relationship derives from Eq. 9 and captures optimal fertility decisions:
where we denote λ 0 ≡ v v+β(1+β) . The NN curve is downward sloping with respect to n,
for two main reasons. First, in light of children being 'investment goods', higher interest rates tend to lower the returns from children (relative to capital) and thus discourage fertility (term proportional to ψg A ). This effect disappears when ψ goes to zero. Second, with respect to children being 'consumption goods', higher interest rates which lower intertemporal wealth from social security transfers (term proportional to σφ) lower consumption--and hence fertility.
The partial equilibrium comparative statics on n abstracting from social security variables (τ, σ), and holding R constant are:
For a given R, higher costs of children (resp. lower preference for children) reduce fertility. Tighter credit constraints (lower θ) increases disposable income for consumption when middle-aged and 10 The simplifying assumption of = 1 also matters for the response of interest rate to changes in fertility. With < 1, on one hand, higher fertility lowers ascendant transfers from middle-aged to older parents, increasing their disposable income and saving, thus lowering the real interest rate. On the other hand, when expected received transfers in old-age increase less than proportionally with fertility, the 'transfer effect' through which higher fertility increases interest rates is dampened. thus the demand for children. Most relevant to our analysis is the effect of growth: a growth slowdown (a fall in g A ), holding R constant, is associated with lower returns on children and thus fertility. This effect is absent when ψ = 0.
Equilibrium for a given social security scheme. A steady-state equilibrium of fertility n and interest rate R (or equivalently capital per efficiency unit k) for a given social security scheme
The slopes of these two curves are respectively positive and negative throughout, thus guaranteeing that their intersection is unique. The equilibrium fertility rate lies in the space λ 0
. In Figure 1 , the equilibrium for a given set of parameter values under laissez-faire (σ = τ = b = 0), is illustrated graphically. (SS) :
and underpins the sustainability of the government budget in the long-run. The right hand-side is the (primary) government deficit in a given period, where expenditures are captured by the replacement rate σ divided by the rate of demographic growth (i.e ratio of contributing workers to retirees) multiplied by the rate of productivity growth. Higher economic growth (either through population or productivity growth) relaxes the government's budget constraint. The left hand side determines the amount of government assets necessary to stabilize the budget deficit. A higher interest rate compared to economic growth (ng A ) requires a positive government asset over GDP (b) to finance its primary deficit. On the contrary, the case in which R < ng A allows the government to stabilize its debt while running primary deficits.
Equations 11, 12 and 13 together determine the long-run equilibrium fertility and interest rate in the economy. The social security policies are assumed to be exogenous in the present study, and the government can let either σ, τ , or b to adjust, ensuring 13 holds. Letting b adjust can lead to multiple equilibria in the steady state (see Appendix 6) , and for this reason we choose first to ignore this case and consider the alternative cases in which the government targets a given level of asset over GDP (b) and let the tax rate (τ ) and/or the replacement rate (σ) adjust.
Laissez Faire
We now examine fertility, interest rate and saving dynamics in autarky under laissez-faire-an absence of a social security system (τ t = σ t = b t = 0 for all t). This benchmark case helps build intuition on the workings of the baseline model.
In this closed economy with full depreciation, s t is both the national saving rate and investment rate. Using Eqs. 9 and 10, we have the following expressions for national saving and fertility:
where λ 0 ≡ v v+β(1+β) . This equation leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under laissez-faire and endogenous fertility, the saving rate and the fertility rate are constant at all dates t > 0, with
Comparative Statics. We proceed to investigate the effects of changes in various parameters on the equilibrium fertility rate and national saving rate in a closed economy-under unconstrained fertility and binding fertility constraints.
Productivity growth. A fall in productivity growth g A lowers the interest rate as the marginal productivity of capital falls. However, under laissez faire, growth does not affect fertility and saving. These decisions are indeed driven by the growth to interest rate ratio, g A /R, which is independent of g A . 11
Credit Constraints. A loosening of credit constraints (higher θ) leads to lower equilibrium fertility rate and a lower equilibrium saving rate though higher borrowing of the young and lower disposable income of the middle-aged-savers: dn LF dθ < 0, ds LF dθ < 0. This implies that a country with tighter credit constraints have a higher desired fertility rate than countries with looser credit constraints.
Increased borrowing of the young reduces disposable income in middle age, thus lowering the number of desired children. A reduced number of children tends to raise the saving rate-partially offsetting the negative impact of looser credit constraints on saving.
Preference for Children and Costs of Children. Since ∂n LF /∂v > 0, an increase in v raises the desired number of children n t , given any s t+1 . The KK curve is unaffected, thus resulting in a higher fertility rate and a lower equilibrium national saving rate. Changes to v thus exogenously alter the optimal rate of fertility, and affects the saving rate only through its impact on fertility.
The optimal laissez-faire fertility rate n LF also shows that ∂n LF /∂φ < 0. Higher costs to children leads to fewer desired children, given any s t+1 , and higher costs to children lowers saving rate, given any fertility rate n t . This amounts to a leftward shift of the NN curve and a downward shift of the KK curve. The net effect is a lower fertility rate, and an unaltered national saving rate: while higher costs to children leads to a lower saving rate, fewer equilibrium number of children raises the saving rate; the two effects exactly cancel out in determining national saving rate.
Constrained Fertility. Suppose that the economy starts from the steady state prior to period t, and fertility becomes binding from t onwards. The NN curve is no longer relevant and is replaced by a vertical line n t = n max for all t (shown as a two-children policy in Figure 1 ). When fertility constraints are binding (n max < n LF ), then the national saving rate is higher under constrained fertility than under unconstrained fertility: s nmax > s LF and the interest rate lower R nmax < 11 According to the KK and NN schedules, a constant gA/R ratio is the outcome of two-counteracting forces that exactly offset each other: lower productivity growth reduces incentives to have children (NN curve shifts to the left); it also lowers the equilibrium interest rate, which tends to increase fertility (KK curve shifts to the right). In other words, incentives to have children depends on the ratio gA/R, and optimal saving/borrowing decisions also depend on this ratio, which is independent on productivity growth under laissez-faire. national saving rate as a consequence of a reduction in total expenditures on children. There is an additional channel through which fertility could affect saving: lower fertility reduces expected transfers, stimulating saving ('transfer channel'). This channel turns out to cancel out in the autarky general equilibrium due to the adjustment of the interest rate. 12 It is however important to keep in mind that in an open economy setting, this channel will be in operation.
Social Security and Fertility Policies: PAYGO in the Long Run
When social security variables can interact with saving and fertility, implications of policy reforms and growth shocks can be quite different from those under laissez-faire. We proceed to analyze these issues in an analytically tractable case-where the social security system is characterized by a paygo scheme, and where social security variables are constant in the long run. We show that the impact of fertility policies and growth shocks crucially hinge on whether a social security system is in place, and in particular-under what scheme it operates.
PAYGO in the Closed-Economy
In a PAYGO system (closed economy), b = 0, and the three fundamental steady-state equations (Eq. 11, 12 and 13) become, in the steady state:
Social security policies. Two types of social security schemes are considered, and the combination thereof is ignored albeit in principle possible. Given a set of parameters, the government can either target a certain replacement rateσ and let taxes τ adjust, or vice-versa. Aσ-scheme refers to the case where the government sets the replacement ratio σ =σ and lets τ adjust; and ā τ -scheme where the government sets τ =τ and lets σ adjust. Solving for equilibrium fertility rate n (τ ) and interest rate R (τ ) after substituting in Eq. (SS) gives:
Thus, equilibrium fertility rate n s and interest rate R s under a paygo system of scheme s = {τ ;σ} 12 The expected total amount of transfers received by parents from children in period t + 1 is ψn w t+2 R t+2 , an increase in n would tend to raise expected transfers and lower saving. The general equilibrium effect of changes in the wage-interest ratio offset the rise in n (wt+2/Rt+2 falls)-and in this case-perfectly. satisfy the following equations: 13 nτ = n(τ ) ; Rτ = R(τ ) nσ = n(τσ) ; Rσ = R(τσ) where τσ =σ nσg A .
Compared to laissez-faire (τ = σ = 0), the interest rate is higher in the presence of social security (τ > 0; σ > 0): a reduced need to save in middle-age together with lower disposable income lower saving rates and raises the interest rate. The associated fertility rate is also lower with social security than without-the reasons for which are two-fold: taxes to finance social security lowers disposable income for consumption in middle-age and thus the demand for children (children as consumption goods); moreover, by increasing the rate of interest, social security reduces fertility (children as investment goods). Roughly speaking, children and social security are substitutes. This is illustrated on Figure 2 where the steady-state equilibrium moves from the laissez-faire to a paygo system under schemeσ with a replacement rateσ = 30%. Similar results hold under aτ scheme. Importantly, a feedback loop between endogenous taxes τσ and fertility nσ emerges under a 13 Equilibrium fertility and interest rate are provided implicitly under aσ-scheme (i.e as a function of endogenous tax policy τσ). We do so to keep expressions compact. Proof of existence (and uniqueness) of the equilibrium for nσ and Rσ is relegated into Appendix 6, together with the space ofσ for which a solution exists (σ bounded above). σ-scheme: higher replacement rateσ leads to higher taxes, which lowers fertility by reducing consumption, and lower fertility in turn feeds back onto raising taxes further (viability of the pension program)-and so on and so forth.
Productivity growth and social security. Any effect of growth on interest rates and fertility must come through necessary adjustments in social security, as we have shown that in the laissezfaire case fertility is independent of g A . It turns out that the particular type of scheme under a paygo system bears very different consequences. Under aτ -scheme, g A /R being independent of g A means that the demand for children as investment goods is unchanged as before. And as disposable income in middle-aged also remains constant with a fixedτ , consumption is unaffected, 14 and optimal fertility is again independent of growth. Under aσ-scheme however, taxes must rise to balance the budget--lowering disposable income, consumption and thus the demand for children.
This fall in fertility forces the government to raise taxes even more to keep replacement rates constant-inducing a further fall in fertility. The long-run equilibrium is the outcome of this feedback loop between fertility and taxes. Under any of the two schemes, the interest rate will be lower under slower productivity growth, due to the fall in the marginal product of capital, but more so under aσ-scheme than under aτ -scheme. The reason is that the reduction in fertility under aσ-scheme exerts upward pressure on saving (net of investment) and thereby push down the interest rate further. These results are given by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under endogenous fertility, a fall in productivity growth g A lowers fertility under a paygo scheme where taxes endogenously adjust (σ-scheme) but leave fertility unchanged if replacement rate endogenously adjust (τ -scheme). Interest rates fall in both cases but by more under ā σ-scheme. That is,
Constrained fertility and social security. Fertility constraints-such as the one-child policythat lowers fertility makes it is necessary for the replacement ratio or taxes to adjust to keep the PAYGO system viable (Equation (SS)). It is important to note that the impact on the interest rate of such a policy is different under laissez-faire and under a paygo system, but also different under the two alternatives schemes of the paygo system (σ andτ ), as demonstrated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Implementing a binding fertility constraint n = n max raises saving by more under a paygo scheme where replacement ratios endogenously adjust (τ -scheme) than under a paygo scheme where taxes endogenously adjust (σ-scheme). That is,
These results emanate directly from comparative statics conducted on R as determined by the KK-curve. 15 When replacement ratios endogenously adjust, it falls one for one with the fall in n, causing saving to rise and the interest rate to fall. On the other hand, when σ is constant, taxes have to rise in order to guarantee the same replacement ratio-inducing saving to fall and the interest rate to rise. The direct effect of a fall in n is to raise saving in both cases, but some of that is offset under a tax increase (σ-scheme), whereas it is magnified under aτ -scheme.
We now examine the case in which the country is a small open economy and takes the world interest as given. While this assumption is arguable for the case of China, the example is nevertheless helpful to build intuition regarding the difference between autarky and the open economy.
One can interpret our results under a small open economy as a limiting case where interest rate do
not adjust at all.
PAYGO in a Small Open Economy
The dynamics under a small open economy (SOE) are characterized by Eqs. 4 and 9, but where k t , in any period t, is determined by an efficiency condition that equalizes the marginal productivity of capital to the world interest rate. Consequently, the KK curve is a horizontal line. The other two equations are, in the steady-state,
where R * denotes the steady-state world interest rate. Under a paygo system (b = 0) following ā σ-scheme, fertility and taxes satisfy
Comparative statics. Fertility reacts less to an increase inσ in the closed-economy scenario than in the SOE scenario. The prevention of any rise in the interest rate shuts off the feedback effect onto lower fertility, and consequently, reduces the amount of rise in τσ necessary to balance the budget. Increasing the replacement rate is thus less costly under an open economy. On the contrary, fertility reacts more to a fall in productivity growth rate g A in an open economy. The reason is that in a closed-economy setting, the fall in fertility due to lower growth is dampened by a fall in the interest rate. When this dampening effect is shut off in the SOE case, the fertility falls by more and is thus matched by a greater increase in taxes to balance the budget.
Policy and Growth Experiments
The transitory and long-run consequences of relevant policy reforms are analyzed under a more general setting. The three experiments surround (1) a one child policy and its relaxation; (2) increases in social security benefits; and (3) 
Steady-state and Calibration
In the policy experiments that follow, the economy always starts from a well-defined initial steadystate under endogenous fertility. The calibration of the initial steady state under autarky is given in Financial integration of a small open economy. In all our experiments described below, the economy starts of at t = 1 from its autarkic steady-state. We assume that when liberalizing its capital account at t = 2 in the SOE case, China opens up to a world with a higher interest rate-an assumption that is based on the observed direction of capital flows from China to the rest of the world. Here, the world interest rate is set to R * = 9.2% on an annual basis, slightly above the high growth/high fertility autarky steady-state in China (see Table 2 ). 16 Other parameters values for China will be kept identical.
The effect of integration is present in all of the policy reforms analyzed under the SOE case-in addition to the possible effect on fertility brought about by the policy reforms-and therefore merits mention. The rise in interest rates following integration triggers a fall in the natural rate of fertility (and higher taxes) from its autarkic level as illustrated by the SOE steady-state in Table 2 . 17 The direct impact of integration, however, will be small as the difference between the autarkic and world interest rate is rather small.
In the policy experiments that follow, we perform numerical simulations of social security and fertility policies as well as growth experiments under aσ-scheme. We focus on aσ-scheme since the objective is to assess how the economy would adjust to shocks if the generosity of the existing 
Policy experiments (σ-scheme)
The one child policy. Under this policy, fertility is constrained to one child per household for one generation (during t = 2), and then fully relaxed at t = 3. The real interest rate, fertility and taxes under a closed-economy model with exogenous fertility and one under endogenous fertility are shown in Fig. 3 . Juxtaposed is also the small-open economy endogenous fertility case. 18
The one-child policy leads to a large rise in saving (net of investment) and a required tax hike when the one-child generation becomes the main contributors to social security (t = 4)-under all scenarios. In the closed-economy cases, the large rise in saving occasions a large fall in the interest rate on impact, followed by a gradual rise as the fertility constraint is relaxed. Taxes rise the most in the small open economy case, by 14.2% (from 7.8% to 22%) on impact, compared to Table 2 . The one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3. 8.5% on impact in the autarky cases. Comparing with a closed-economy model where fertility is exogenous, taxes remain persistently higher in the endogenous fertility model (both under autarky and SOE). This is due to two important feedback loops. The first one is the feedback of higher tax rates onto lower fertility and back onto higher taxes. This is the feedback effect that is absent in the exogenous autarky case. Hence, tax rates are higher for longer and interest rates revert more slowly in the endogenous fertility case (lower fertility limits the fall in saving and thus contains the subsequent rise in interest rate). The second one is the feedback loop from lower interest rates to higher fertility-which tends to ease pressure on social security and mitigate the fall in fertility triggered by the policy. This is the feedback loop that is absent in the small open economy, which thus features a lower fertility rate. Required tax rates are therefore substantially larger in the open economy. In sum, the one child policy shock is more persistent in the endogenous fertility case compared to the exogenous fertility case under autarky, and is more costly in the open economy than in autarky.
A rise in the replacement ratioσ. As China is currently expanding the coverage of its social Notes: Parameters values are shown in Table 2 . The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t=3 fromσ = 30% toσ = 50%. security system, this reform is tantamount to a rise in the replacement ratio in our model. 19 The experiment we analyze consists of a rise inσ from its initial value of 30% to 50%. Results are shown in Fig. 4 . Taxes must rise to stabilize government budget. Under autarky, the immediate fall in saving resulting from higher social security benefits and subsequently from the required tax hike exert continued upward pressure on interest rates. Under endogenous fertility however, the drop in fertility due to higher taxes limits the impact of the drop in saving and thus the rise in interest rates. The reduction in fertility entails a larger rise in taxes-from 7.6% to 13.9%, under endogenous fertility compared to only 12.7% under exogenous fertility. Restraints on the interest rate in the open economy however limits the extent of the fall in fertility compared to autarky and thus the required rise in tax rates is smaller. In sum, increasing the generosity of social security benefits requires higher tax rates with longer adjustment under endogenous fertility compared to exogenous fertility, and is also less costly in an open economy than in a closed-economy.
In an another experiment (omitted for convenience), we combine the two experiments described above. We analyze the necessary tax adjustment if the Chinese government were to increase the generosity of the existing system (rising the replacement ratioσ from 30% to 50%) exactly when the generation of only-child is contributing to the pension system (t = 4). As expected, the tax hike at t = 4 is very large (taxes increase by 28% in the SOE case and by 18% under autarky).
In the short-term, taxes increase more in the open economy. To the opposite, in the long-term, as the generation of only child goes into retirement, taxes fall in both cases but remain persistently higher under autarky.
Growth experiments (σ-scheme)
Growth has been remarkably high in China over the last thirty years. The recent expansion of social security coverage in China has been facilitated by this growth success but questions emerge regarding the growth performance of China in the next decades. We investigate the implications of a growth slowdown in the next experiments.
A Permanent Slowdown in Growth. In this experiment, China experiences a permanent growth slowdown from an annual rate of productivity growth of 4.5% to 1.5% (occurring at t = 3).
Results are displayed in Fig. 5 .
The permanent fall in the growth rate leads to an immediate and permanent decline in the autarky interest rates. Higher taxes are required to balance the budget in the face of lower growth, and the resulting lower saving subsequently dampens the fall in the interest rate. Taxes rise progressively from 7.6% to 14.9% under exogenous fertility, to 17% under endogenous fertility in autarky, and to 28% in an open economy. A notable difference between the autarkic cases is the larger and more persistent fall in interest rates with endogenous fertility-where the drop in optimal fertility (due to lower growth) stimulates saving and further lowers the interest rate. The main difference that marks the closed and open economy endogenous fertility models is the much larger drop in fertility in the latter. Both low growth and the required tax hike lead to a fall in the natural fertility rate, but the lower interest rate acts as a counteracting force to the decline in fertility-an effect that is absent in the SOE scenario. The key parameter determining the response of fertility to a change in growth over the interest rate (g A /R) is ψ relative to v. With a high value of ψ The fall of fertility to around 1.6 can be treated as an upper bound of the impact -as interest rates, in reality, do adjust somewhat.
In summary, without the feedback loop of lower fertility and higher tax rates, the exogenous fertility model predicts the lowest increase in taxes, and without the feedback of lower interest rates onto higher fertility that tends ease social security pressure, the SOE case thus features the highest required tax rate. The impact of a permanently growth slowdown is more costly for the stability of the social security system in an open economy. This means that, facing a growth slowdown, the Chinese government will face severe difficulties to keep the generosity of the existing system and simultaneously deepen the capital account liberalization. This difficulty would be particularly acute if the growth slowdown occurs when the generation of only-child ages, as illustrated in the following experiment. Table 2 . The permanent growth slowdown is implemented at t=3 where gA − 1 moves from 4.5% to 1.5% (annual basis).
One child policy and slow growth experiment. We now examine the joint impact of the previous experiment together with the aging of population driven by the one-child policy (see Fig.   6 ). Together, they exert a large negative impact on the interest rate under autarky. The interest rate then gradually increases over time as the one child policy is abandoned-finally reaching a level lower than the initial steady state due to the permanent drop in growth. The required taxes rise sharply from 7.7% to 26% in the autarkic exogenous-fertility case, to 31% (within two periods) in the endogenous fertility case, and to a much higher tax rate of 42%--while staying permanently above 30%-in the SOE case. The cumulative effect of the combined shock generates a quantitatively larger and more persistent fall in interest rates in autarky. As a consequence, the decline in fertility in an open economy is much larger and more persistent: the complete adjustment of taxes takes 
Sensitivity analysis
Alternative social security schemes. We investigate how our results depend on the social security scheme under consideration. An alternative scenario moving away from a paygo system is the existence of a trust fund, whereby the government holding positive assets (b > 0) can smooth negative productivity or demographic shocks over time by partly selling its stock of assets. We assume that the government in China starts out with b = 0.02 before the implementation of the one child policy. 20 If the government maintains it at the same level, any increase in the interest Notes: Structural parameters are shown in Table 2 but China starts with b = 0.02 > 0. The one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3. China reduces b to 0.0175 at t=3 and 0 at t=4. rate will tend to relax its budget constraint. This makes financial integration under a higher world interest rate than the autarkic level beneficial for the government. In a simulation with b = 0.02 (keeping other parameters constant), for instance, taxes actually fall following integration: the fall in revenues due to the integration-induced fertility drop is more than compensated by an increase due to the higher return on government assets. The feedback loop from higher taxes to lower fertility does not take effect and fertility therefore falls by less.
It is also important to understand the impact of the trust fund on the autarky steady-state: with a higher b, interest rate is lower (KK shifts upwards) and fertility higher. Conversely, a permanent fall in the trust fund will increase the interest rate and lower fertility-in the autarkic steady-state.
This means that when the trust fund is used to smooth a negative shock, the government is faced with a trade-off in the autarky case: limiting the rise in taxes in the short-run, at the expense of permanently higher taxes in the future. This is illustrated in Fig. 7 under the one-child policy experiment. The government is assumed to exhaust its trust fund in two generations after the policy implementation (t = 3, 4), and tax three periods only.
contributions increases significantly less between t = 2 and t = 4 (by 6.5% compared to 9% when b is kept constant). However, under endogenous fertility, such a policy incurs permanent long-run costs -in the form of higher taxes and lower fertility in the long-run. Similar findings hold under the experiment of a permanent growth slowdown.
In the open economy, this trade-off between short-run gains (smoothing) and long-run costs largely disappears when adverse interest rate movements responding to the fall in the trust fund are absent. Consequently, only the direct impact of taxes is in operation-smaller revenues due to the exhaustion of the trust fund and correspondingly higher taxes. The required rise in taxes is thus significantly less in the SOE case compared to the autarky case. This is also true all along the transition where the government does not face adverse interest rates movements when selling assets. The example illustrates clearly how running down the trust fund is more effective to smooth negative shocks in an open economy as taxes (resp. fertility) are lower (resp. higher) in the former.
Sensitivity to structural parameters.
Intergenerational transfers. We examine the role of intergenerational transfers in generating these results by adopting an alternative calibration where the steady-state fertility is everywhere identical except for ψ = 0 presently considered. 21 This economy behaves very closely to all experiments conducted under exogenous fertility-in the sense that fertility reacts less to shocks to growth or toσ, and adjusts faster to a one-child policy shock. The reason is that when children are no longer 'investment goods', fertility reacts much less to changes in the interest rate (NN is steeper) and to expected changes in growth.
An alternative but equally interesting question is how the Chinese economy would adjust if
altruism towards the parents were to decrease. We investigate the steady-state properties of our benchmark economy allowing for the parameter ψ to fall from 10% to 5%. Consider the long-run equilibrium under aσ scheme: both a reduced desire to have children (NN curve shifts left), and a substitution towards higher saving (KK curve shifts down) would ensue. The equilibrium interest rate and fertility rate will both fall: under current parameters values, n would fall from 2.85 to 2.5, and R from 9.04% to 7.7%, while taxes would increase from 7.6% to 8.8%. The fall in fertility and the rise in taxes would be much higher in an open economy-in the absence of the counteracting interest rate movements that tend to stimulate fertility. The consequence of a disintegration of the traditional mode of saving is thus to put more strain on the social security system (unless binding fertility constraints are kept in place), and exert even larger pressure if capital accounts were open.
Financial development. We also examine the importance of credit constraints, considering that financial development in China may harbinger a permanent loosening of credit constraints for households. The model predicts that easing credit constraints would put pressure on a PAYGO social security system by reducing the equilibrium natural rate of fertility-the extent of which depends on how strongly fertility reacts to changes in the interest rate (stronger under high ψ).
In the experiment considered, θ rises from 0.01 to 0.1, keeping other parameters constant. Looser 21 The preference parameter for children, v, is adjusted to 0.19 to keep fertility constant in the steady-state. credit constraints occasions less saving, for any given fertility rate, and a higher interest rate under autarky (KK curve shifts up), which further reduces optimal fertility. Tax rates rise to keep replacement ratios constant. In the autarkic steady state, the interest rate rises to 9.6% (annualized), fertility falls by 0.3 children (per family) and social security contributions increase from 7.6% to 9.4%. The transitory dynamics are also affected by financial development of this kind: with higher θ, aggregate savings respond more to changes in growth. Consequently, interest rates are also more sensitive to changes in growth-and thus also fertility and taxes. Relaxing credit constraints, however, is less costly in an open economy, as the additional feedback link between higher interest rates and lower fertility is absent and the drop in fertility is more limited.
Conclusion
Domestic policy reforms along with potential growth shocks in China interact in a way that makes the timing of the various reforms particularly important in limiting the fiscal pressure exerted on the pension program. In some instances, certain policy reforms jointly undertaken can imply massive and sudden adjustments in tax contributions that could have otherwise been smaller and better smoothed over time. Capital account liberalization can either aid or exacerbate the strain on social security that fertility policies or social security reforms may bring. These interactions are absent when fertility decisions are taken to be exogenous, and hence our framework-in which interlinkages between interest rates, fertility and social security are key-yield very different predictions on the magnitude and dynamics of the fiscal adjustments needed to maintain (or expand) the existing pension system.
China's various reforms can also have international ramifications in an increasingly globalized economy, and the extent of these effects depends on the basic asymmetries that characterize countries like China and the U.S. Differences in fertility, financial development, and pension systems all play an important role, and any such policy changes can spillover onto the social security system abroad. Some policies can potentially relieve pressure on the sustainability of the social security system in the U.S. For example, policies aimed at reducing fertility in China can inadvertently stimulate fertility abroad, as can a growth slowdown in China. All in all, policies that lead to low fertility and consequently high contributions to social security in China might leave the world interest rates depressed for a long time to come.
Multiple equilibria and government asset policy
State variables are (k t , b t , n t ) whose dynamics is described by Eqs. 4, 9 and 10. We focus on the dynamic adjustment of b for a given for a given fiscal policy (τ, σ).
Steady-state analysis (three fundamental equations):
(KK) :
with Φ = (1 + β) α 1−α + θ + ψ 1+β and λ 0 = v [β(1+β)+v] . We have three equations and three unknown (k, b, n) or equivalently (R, b, n) with R = αk α−1 .
First solve for b(n) using Eqs. 18 and 19: If ∆(n) > 0 (note that this is always the case if τ > σ ng A ), two solutions for b(n) denoted b 1 (n) and b 2 (n) with b 1 (n) < b 2 (n) for all n: Then, using Eqs. 19 and 20 gives:
Or equivalently:
The intersection between b(n) and b 1 (n) (resp. b(n) and b 2 (n)), when it exists, gives n 1 and n 2 (equilibrium fertility associated to b 1 and b 2 ). It also gives conditions on the space (τ, σ) for which the two equilibria exist as function of the parameters. R 1 and R 2 are immediately deduced using Eq. 19. This also means that letting b adjust can lead to multiple equilibria (or none if τ is too small). Note that we also have R 1 > R 2 and n 2 > n 1 . One can show that the stable equilibrium is (R 2 , b 2 , n 2 ). Proof. Let us study the variations of F (n) and G(n):
F is increasing for n > 2σ (1−θ−ψ)g A ; lim n→∞ F = +∞ and min F = F (2σ (1−θ−ψ)g A ) = 4φσ (1−θ−ψ) 2 g A .
G is increasing; lim n→∞ G = ψβ+λ 0 Φ ψβ+Φ < lim n→∞ F ; lim n→0 G = λ 0 (1+β) 1+βλ 0 > 4φσ (1−θ−ψ) 2 g A = min F (Assumption 6).
The equation F (nσ) = G(nσ) has thus two solutions, one between [σ (1−θ−ψ)g A ; 2σ (1−θ−ψ)g A ] and one above 2σ (1−θ−ψ)g A .
If n < 2σ (1−θ−ψ)g A , thenσ ng A = τ > (1−θ−ψ)
2
. This equilibrium is ruled out by Assumption 6 (as it is unstable and features very high taxes and fertility close to zero).
Finally, note that for n <σ (1−θ−ψ)g A , F (n) < 0 < G(n) (F and G do not cross for n <σ (1−θ−ψ)g A ).
Thus the equilibrium exists and is unique with nσ > 2σ (1−θ−ψ)g A .
-if ψ < λ 0 Φ:
G is decreasing; lim n→∞ G = ψβ+λ 0 Φ ψβ+Φ < lim n→∞ F ; lim n→0 G = λ 0 (1+β) 1+βλ 0 > 4φσ (1−θ−ψ) 2 g A = min F (Assumption 6).
Same reasoning as previously applies.
Rσ is immediately deduced using Rσ = R(τσ) and τσ =σ nσg A .
